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Abstract
This paper presents an overview of the European Union involvement in agricultural
restructuring.  By way of introduction it looks at the processes of farm replication
operating in Europe and the forces behind them.  It then  considers the wider application
of EU measures in each Member State and how they interrelate with the national
property laws and social customs.  In conclusion the paper appraises the restructuring
policies by examining the balance between legitimising the concentration of property
rights amongst a minority and the fragmentation of estates between the majority.
2Introduction
In western economies at least, land is considered an essential production tool necessary
to farm: in order to farm, the individual must first secure access to land.  The
ownership of property rights also confers a measure of power and prestige within rural
societies (Marsden et al.,1993).  The process is complicated by the complex nature of
land ownership itself, by the limited availability of land, and by the overwhelmingly
private nature of its ownership.
The stewardship that accompanies ownership rights in the European Union implies
family continuity and occupational immobility which has been, and continues to be, the
underlying factor in agricultural property appropriation throughout most of the EU.
The transfer of agricultural proprietary rights between generations is a major element
in the replication of European farming.  Agricultural businesses in Europe exhibit a far
greater degree of social heredity, the passing on of farms between generations within
the same family, than do other industries (Blanc and Perrier Cornet , 1993).
The emphasis on the concept of land as common property, if taken beyond the limited
right to enjoy defined elements of the property (Sh ard, 1987), implies free access to
ownership devoid of structural barriers erected implicitly by society, and, more
recently, by the State.  In reality, the social structures underpinning agriculture and
agricultural land ownership play too major a role for the classical theories of market
economy to determine alone the distribution of agricultural property.
In some Member States (e.g. France, Denmark, Ireland), the concept of the family
farm is viewed not solely as an efficient development model but as a key embodiment
of national identity (Thompson, 1970; Reid, 1992).  In this respect the European
experience mirrors that of the United States, where farming is seen as the repository of
moral and family values.
The liberalising process of of agriculture within the central and eastern European
countries (CEECs) has been dominated by the re-privatisation of land rights.  This has
tended to overshadow the pressures for reform within EU countries themselves, and
3the structural problems of EU agriculture, as it adjusts to changing world markets and
the re-alignment of support towards public rather than private goods (Buller et al,
1992).  Thus it was only in 1996 that the Commission adopted a report on ‘Young
Farmers and the Problems of Succession’ (CEC 1996), highlighting and offering
recommendations for the problems of an ageing workforce, falling farm incomes, and
barriers posed by production constraints, as well as the negative image of farming in
society and the continued desertification of certain rural areas.  Despite the continuing
processes of strengthening the economic and social cohesion of the Community, the
EC Treaty (article 222) has expressly avoided intervening in the national systems of
allocation of property rights, and indeed has specified little direct control over land.
Agriculture, as practised within individual Member States, continues to operate the
national land property allocation rights, although free movement of nationals between
countries (articles 48,52), and free access to the property rights of all countries is
guaranteed.  Member States, therefore, continue to exhibit different degrees of
subdivision of property rights.  In some, the notion of landow er is synonymous with
that of armer, whereas others exhibit a high acceptance of the concept of agricultural
leaseholds (‘rents’) or other proprietary allocation.  In a sense, attaching importance to
a link between levels of owner-occupation and farming traditions (Hoggart and Buller,
1987) understates the significance of co-operative organisation, a feature which
transcends the physical determination of farm structures in for instance France,
Denmark and the Netherlands, but is at the same time almost absent in others e.g. The
United Kingdom and Ireland.
Whilst property laws have remained under national control, other measures aimed
directly at controlling agricultural activity have been adopted across the Community.
Throughout the EC, commercial farming is increasingly facing restructuring under
economic pressures. However, access to land is hampered by high values and
monopolistic production rights (e.g. milk quotas), high entry costs and historical social
barriers; often entrenched by restrictive legal rights, limiting access to those with
inheritance rights and those already established within the industry who are able to
capitalise on economies of scale.  Structural immobility, social discrimination, inflated
property market values, and inconsistent interventions on the part of Member State
4governments are presented as hindrances to structural reform that are hampering
efficient economic resource allocation and management.
Restructuring is seen as an important process in the modernisation of European
agriculture.  The accession to the EU in the 1980s of the Mediterranean States that are
characterised as small land holdings or ‘peasantism’ (Ellis 1988, Black 1992), and the
impending EU enlargement eastwards to liberalise state and collectively owned
farmland in the CEECshave exacerbated the need to restructure agricultural production
in Europe.  The feasibility of efficient restructuring depends on the socio-economic
standing of landowners and farmworkers and is significantly influenced by: tenurial
structures (Marsden et al, 1993); state support for agriculture (Just 1994); the
prospects for multiple use (Arkleton Trust, 1992); and by established practises
governing inheritance and gender relations (Whatmore, 1991).
The European context
(see Table 1)
Agriculture represents the major land use in Europe, occupying more than half the total
community area (Eurostat, 1990).  If forested land, rough grazing and grazing marshes
are added, the proportion rises to 95% of the total area.  Agriculture contributes a
declining share of GDP in each of the fifteen Member States (1977-1990, OECD
1994), the percentage share varying from 11.6% in Greece to 0.9% in Sweden.  The
proportion of the population employed in the sector is only 7% over the community
(CEC, 1991), although this too varies markedly between Member States e.g. UK
2.1%; Greece 24.5% (Table 3).  As a consequence, the fact that agriculture currently
receives approximately 58% of the EC budget (Office 1991), makes it an increasingly
contentious and political issue and leaves agriculture in a vulnerable position.
Notwithstanding the size of its budget share, agriculture is the chief policy domain of
the EC (van der Velde & Snyder, 1991), with about three-quarters of the EC
legislation relating directly to the sector.  Structural problems remain largely unsolved,
as illustrated by two features:
51. An increasingly aged population.  Only 8.3% of farm owner/managers are under
thirty-five, while 24.5% are over sixty-five (Eurostat, 1990, seeTable 3).  This is
likely to impact upon the ability and willingness to invest in, and adopt, modern
practises, hampering the reform processes.
2. Large numbers of small holdings where economic viability depends on EC aid, or
where the farmer relies on non-agricultural income to maintain his living standard.
Average holding size is only 13.3 hectares, varying from 64 hectares in the United
Kingdom, to only 4 hectares in Greece (Table 4).
Despite the enormous variety of production systems to be found within its territorial
limits, agriculture remains central to Community policy, and was one of the main
considerations behind the original concept of a formal alliance in Europe (H rvieu and
Lagrave, 1992; Hill, 1984; Clout, 1993).  Article 3d of the EC Treaty requires the
adoption of a common agricultural policy (CAP), whose aims (article 39) were:
(1) to increase farm productivity;
(2) to provide for a decent standard of living for farmers;
(3) to promote market stabilisation for agricultural products;
(4) to ensure security of food supplies; and,
(5) to foster price structures that were ‘fair’ to the consumers of farm products
(Averyt, 1977).
Such objectives are to be achieved through, amongst other things, the optimal
utilisation of the factors of production.  The CAP was formulated with regard to the
social structure of agriculture, regional variations in structures, and the fact that
agriculture was closely linked with the economy as a whole.
Property ownership and planning law are specifically outside the remit of the EC
(article 222), and currently remain the subject of national regulation within each
Member State.  Nonetheless, the regulatory powers conferred by CAP  on the
European Commission have enabled it to prescribe measures which have had a direct
effect on the use of land (most notably vineyards [Reg 822/87] and dairy farms [Reg
804/68]), and the Commission has the power to influence land use in any of the sectors
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here was challenged in Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (1979) ECR 3727
(1980) where it was held that restricting access to production rights (in this instance
the planting of new vineyards) did not amount to an infringement of the individual’s
right to property.
The CAP operates through two policy vehicles: market management and structural
policy.  Of these two mechanisms, for a variety of political and social reasons, market
management has dominated (Bowers and Cheshire, 1983), and structural policy has
until recently been implemented largely at the discretion of Member States (resulting in
an uneven implementation across the Community- see Table 6).  Thus whilst a
‘common policy’ exists, the adherence to national frameworks for rural policy-making
and the specifics of national circumstance remain strong forces in EC decision-making
(Kjeldahl and Tracey, 1994).
(i)  Market management
Market management policies have operated under the umbrella of a common
community-wide market for each commodity (Common Market Organisations-
CMOs).  The main tools that have been adopted are minimum guaranteed prices for
producers, linked with intervention buying, with support from import levies and export
subsidies. Arguably, the measures have proved extremely successful, as evidenced by
increased productivity and the attainment of over-supply in most temperate
commodities.  However, because of the lack of contemporaneous structural reform in
European farming, the measures have encouraged inefficiency (Body, 1992) and the
continuation of outmoded production methods and have hampered farm re-
organisations and environmental improvements.  In addition, because of the largely
open-ended financial commitment implied by intervention policies, the effect on the
community budget has been severe.  This, coupled with the need to bring European
support policies in line with GATT/WTO policies has in the 1990s created an
atmosphere of uncertainty throughout agriculture, and a reluctance to invest in new
techniques.
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(the’MacSharry plan’) through the introduction of production quotas, measures aimed
at re-alignment with world markets, and the de-coupling of commodity support from
tonnage-produced to acreage planted, thus effectively capping the agricultural budget.
It has long been recognised (Franzmeyetal, 1991) that the CMO support in the early
days gave an imbalance towards northern commodities (milk, cereals and oilseeds) at
the expense of Mediterranean products (vines, olives, citrus fruits).  Paradoxically it is
now accepted that the southern States are now those most reliant on, and most likely
to suffer from a reduction in, market support payments.
The establishment through the 1980s and 1990s of production rights (e.g. Milk quotas,
suckler cow quotas, sheep and goat head ge limits, tobacco quotas etc) as a means of
controlling production, has inevitably reduced the opportunities for farm restructuring.
Efficient producers are prevented from expanding, production rights have to be
purchased thereby increasing working capital requirements, and ‘new farmers’ face an
additional starting up cost.  The recent attention (‘Agenda 2000’) being given to the
potential of modulation: the application of financial limits to the aid paid to individuals,
by amongst others, the Commissioner for Agriculture, F anz Fischler, is evidence not
only of the growing political will to tackle agricultural mis-spending but also of the
growing recognition that CMOs need to be more closely integrated with measures
more directly aimed at structural reform.
(ii)  Structural policies
Structural policies have not been widely used as means of agricultural support.  Indeed
they still only account for about 10% of agricultural spending, although the EC has
recognised (CEC, 1989) that it should spend at least one-third of the budget on
structural policy, covering such areas as farm consolidations, young-farmer training
and holdings improvement.  Structural policies are now formalised under various EU
Objectives:
Objective 1: the adjustment of less developed regions,
Objective 5(a): the adjustment of agriculture,
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Objective 6: the adjustment of less densely populated rural areas.
The formal skeleton for structural policy (based largely on the ‘Mansholt Plan’) was
adopted in 1968.  Although it discarded the original scheme to take out of production
permanently some five million hectares of farmland the policy was to be implemented
through three broad Directives:
1. the modernisation of farm businesses (‘structures’);
2. incentives for the cessation of farming; and
3. employment training schemes.
Unlike the market management tools, these policy areas have the potential for directly
affecting farm successions and land availability, even when operated across national
land law structures.  However, because the policies operated at a member state level,
with a financial contribution (about 25%) coming from the EC, the programmes were
not widely taken up (Druesne, 1986).
Recognising its shortcomings, the Council embarked on a series of amendments to the
original system, with adopting Regulations to (inter alia) improve the efficiency of
farming structures; to introduce conversion and extensification of production and to
maintain a viable agricultural community (Reg. 797/85).  Regulation 1096/88 picks up
the policy to encourage the cessation of farming, and Regulation 2328/91 provides for
support for investments in agricultural holdings to improve profitability and living
conditions.  Regulation 2079/92 crucially introduced an early retirement scheme, to
promote the renewal, restructuring and improvement of economic viability.  In
addition, structural policy regulations have encompassed; support for less-favoured
areas (including measures to stem rural depopulation) targeted on the ‘southern’ states,
vocational training assistance, aid for environmentally sensitive areas, and grants for
afforrestation.
The more specific reforms to the CAP commenced in the 1980s have impacted on
structural policy.  The Macsharry Plan has been described as essentially one of social
regulation (van der Velde and Snyder, 1992; Curry and Owen, 1996) involving a
redistribution of support targeted towards smaller farms, thereby reorienting the CAP
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the land (CEC, 1991).  This echoes the words of the Commission in its Per pective
for the CAP:
In the present conditions of limited economic growth in Europe, and taking
account of the ever-increasing importance of the conservation of nature and the
maintenance of the fabric of rural society, there is a need to maintain a
significant number of farmers on the land....
(CEC, 1985)
The Community therefore is challenged to implement pricing policies more in tune with
world market realities, while meeting its commitment to keeping people in agriculture,
with the family farm (see Table 3) as the accepted cornerstone of this policy goal.
More recently, in 1994, the Economic and Social Committee of the EU adopted a
statement (‘opinion’) on young farmers and the problems of succession (CEC, 1994),
highlighting the structural problems facing agriculture and linking their solution
strongly to the promotion of farm startups and entrances.  This led to the
Commission’s report on ‘Young Farmers and the Problems of Succession’(CEC,
1996), which outlined the Community measures aimed at assisting st rtup , a d which
made a number of proposals and recommendations.  The umbrella aid package
introduced under Regulation 797/85 (now covered by Reg. 2328/91) is known as the
‘Common Installation Policy’ and is aimed at reducing the costs of farm entrances,
notably the cost of land and estate capital.
In the context of farm structures, the role of land tenure is central.  The systems of
tenure and the proportion of land owned or rented differ greatly throughout the




Nearly two-thirds of the total agricultural area is tenanted (Table 5), and in many cases
the tenanted part of a farm forms the most important element.  Security of tenure is
therefore important for the encouragement of investment and business expansion.
Security of tenure operates through a minimum term length of 9 years, with successive
periodic terms of nine years being granted automatically except where the landlord has
served notice to quit.  The grounds for such notice are limited, but include the landlord
wishing to farm the land himself.  In addition, tenants are given a pre-emptive right to
purchase all the land in their tenancy should the landlord want to sell.  During their
tenancies, tenants have complete freedom over husbandry, and the right to erect any
agricultural buildings they wish.
Belgian law also contains provisions for land re-allocation (through amalgamation and
redistribution schemes), enabling farm sizes to be increased to an economic size and to
improve farm structures.  Such initiatives are proposed by local government or
landowners and tenants, and then require the authority of local government ministers.
(Strong regionalist sentiment in Belgium ensures that local government remains a
strong force).  Re-allocation has affected 250,000 hectares, or nearly one-fifth of the
agricultural area of Belgium, since 1949, bringing average farm size to 14.8 hectares,
just above the EC average (table 4).
A high proportion of tenanted land should imply easier access for non-farming families
but this is not the experience in Belgium, where farm take-overs remain largely a family
affair, with farming families remaining rooted to their holdings and controlling access
to the land as though they were owner-farmers.  In the implementation of its own
regional aid programmes, and the EC structural policies, the Belgian government




Danish agriculture is characterised by a large number of small, specialist highly
intensified holdings, 94% of which are owner-occupied.  Only 2% of farms are wholly
tenanted.  In area terms however, some 21% of the agricultural area is rented (table 5),
with farm structures consisting mainly of owner-occupied land with some extra rented
land adjoining the holding.
The Danish State regulates all aspects of farm structures through the Agricultural
Holdings Act 1989, governing ownership and acquisition, management, farm size, and
tenancy matters.  Strict land zoning is applied to maintain agricultural (or horticultural
or forestry) usage and all agricultural ‘holdings’ must be registered.  The extent to
which farms can expand or be amalgamated has historically been strictly limited in an
attempt to maintain family farming businesses (Jones, 1986).  Recent economic
pressures on unviable units has forced the State to allow further temporary and
permanent amalgamations, but even these are limited to a maximum holding size of
125 hectares.  Similarly farm subdivisions are closely controlled.
As most farm tenants are also land owners in their own right, no specific tenancy
protection is provided, as long as there is a written contract between the parties.  There
is no security of tenure, no rent regulation, and tenants do not have a pre-emptive right
to purchase.  The rules that do exist generally do not affect the relationship between
the parties, but rather continue the element of state control over farm structures.
Tenants must live on the holding (if they rent the whole farm), and they cannot rent
land from more than five different holdings. The purchasor of a holding must live on it
for eight years, and if the land exceeds 30 hectares the buyer must be trained in
agriculture and must not lease out any of the land.  An existing farmer seeking to buy
more than a further 30 hectares needs a special licence from the land authorities, with
licences to purchase a third holding seldom being granted.  This 30 hectare benchmark
would appear to have been successfully applied by the government, as the average
farm size is 32.2 hectares, second only to the UK in the Community.
12
However, family transfers and successions are facilitated by the application of much
less restrictive rules.  Family ownership has additionally been encouraged until very
recently by outlawing the ownership or renting of holdings by companies, co-
operatives or other associations.  Owner-occupation still features highly under
government policy, but the preservation of the family farm, whilst still seen as
important, is now less so; perhaps providing evidence of the recognition of
agriculture’s importance in the national economy as the major exporter.
Farmers’ sons generally buy out their parents over a long period, at discounts of up to
20% of the market price.  As a consequence, young farmers often have to take off-
farm employment to meet repayments and to compensate for low incomes and high
debts. As farm succession to owner-occupied land implies large capital transfers the
State assists in the process by loan capital schemes, whereby the first five annual
payments are paid for by the government.  A strong policy towards farm modernisation
through  training and technical skills has been followed by the State.
Germany
Germany differs from other European nations in having a large proportion (42%) of
part-time farmers, spending less than half their working time on the holding.  Even so,
at 16.8 hectares, farm size is significantly above the EC average (table 4).  Structural
policies are operated through sixteen federal or regional departments- Lander.  Those
operating in the former East Germany are concerned with reorganising the former state
co-operative farms and establishing a privatised farming structure in their place.  This
is being effected through leasing from a privatisation agency (the BVVG) followed by
land sales under the Compensation Act. Thus there is an ongoing process of farm
structure transformation (Doll and K are, 1995), during which the two systems will be
equalised. It is beyond the remit of this paper to examine the specific problems that
such harmonisation is experiencing (see Klare, 1992).
In the fifty years to 1990, the number of farms in West Germany fell from 1 650 000 to
630 000, and agriculture’s share of the workforce declined  to 3%.  In the former East
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Germany, employment in agriculture is still high, at 10%, with most farmworker  being
employed on co-operative farms, state farms and church farms.
The Federal Act on Land Use Planning 1965 requires the adoption of policies to
maintain a ‘rustic agriculture’ as an efficient sector of the economy, interpreted by the
Lander as the maintenance of family farms, adequate rural infrastructure and the
provision of suitable population densities. This is achieved through structural policies
operated by the Federal and Lander administrations under powers bestowed by the
Federal Law on the Common Action Improvement of Agricultural Structure and
Protection of Coasts 1969/1988.  A distinction is drawn between measures to improve
holding structure through, for instance, consolidation, and measures to improves
efficiency on each holding through investment programmes.  EC measures have been
adopted and consequently the Community contributes towards the cost of such
schemes.  Land consolidation schemes operate under laws of 1953 and 1976 with the
objectives of improving productivity, working conditions and to facilitate regional
development.  This is achieved through the reorganisation of scattered holdings into
economic units, and the provision of infrastructure with the redistribution of land on
the principle of equality of value.  The maintenance of such reformed structures, and
the further pursuit of farm viability and improvement of structure is achieved by the
requirement for prior administrative authorisation for the transfer of ownership
(Administrative Control of the Transfer of Ownership on Agricultural Holdings 1961).
Such permission will usually be refused if the consequent distribution of land is deemed
undesirable, if a deleterious fragmentation would result, or if there is a disproportion
between the price and the value at which the transaction occurs.  The measures are
implemented so as to give farmers priority over non-farmers in the acquisition of land,
and for full-time farmers to have priority over part-timers.  A similar Act of 1985
provides similar controls over the leasing of agricultural land, with powers to compel
the parties to modify or cancel their contract.  This operates less successfully, as it
relies on landlords reporting the contracts (which many chose not to do).  However,
where controls are applied, a more favourable attitude is adopted towards part-time
farmers, acknowledging the importance of renting in this sector.
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The Civil Code which regulates farm tenancies has no prescribed minimum term for
leases, but the tribunal can extend them up to a maximum term of 18 years for farms,
or 12 years for bare land.
The fundamental law on successions involves equality of all heirs.  However, in the
pursuit of structural improvement and farm viability, a number of Federal and Land r
laws depart from this principle and allow the succession to the farm of a single heir,
providing that financial compensation is made to his co-heirs.  Such compensation is
based on farm turnover rather than value.  A fairly common route to successions is
apparent where the successor will work on the farm for a number of years before
entering a formal contract of take-over.  An additional period of training at agricultural
college ensures that young German farmers are relatively experienced before entering a
take-over.  The andover period normally involves the successor leasing the land from
his parents until their death, in return for a monthly rental and benefits in kind.  It is
necessary to provide for the co- irs, and the parents usually undertake to compensate
them at some stage in the passing-over process, leaving the successor to farm relatively
free of debt.
The Netherlands
Some 34% of agricultural land is tenanted (table 5).  Although this proportion is
declining, the sector remains important to Dutch agriculture as some 54% of farms are
wholly or partly tenanted.
Leasing arrangements are closely controlled by provincial government through Land
control boards (Grondkamer).  Leases of equipped farms must be for a minimum of
twelve years, and of six years for bare.  On expiry further six year terms are mandatory
unless the landlord serves a non-renewal notice.  Tenants can, in any event, contest
such notices which will only be upheld by the tribunal in accordance with the principles
of equity or on certain grounds under the Agricultural Lease Act.  Landlords wishing
to sell must first offer the land to their tenants, with the final arbiter as to the price
being the Grondkamer, whose valuation will be based on rents.  As the government
15
sets the level of rents, and these are generally acknowledged to be low, leasehold
values are about 55% of vacant possession.
The Netherlands are distinct in being the only Member State with less than 20% of
farmers aged over 55 (table 3).  A special, unique, transition process has been created
by the Dutch, termed ‘Maatschaps’.  These are associations between parents and
successors during a transition period during which the organisation and control of the
business is passed between generations.  Some 70% of farm entrances are based on
these ‘contracts’, allowing the family to exercise a high degree of control over the
inheritance process.  Dutch farms are highly capitalised, and the gradual nature of the
handovers enables this capital to be passed over relatively free of charge, at low
valuation and relatively free of taxation, confirming the corporatist nature of Dutch
farming.
Non family entrants are therefore at a distinct disadvantage in the Netherlands.  The
State has elected not to interfere with the process and regards policies to assist young
farmers entering farms as pointless.  It does not traditionally assist young farmers
although it does spend almost half of the agricultural budget on supporting agricultural
training and education.
France
At 28 hectares, the average farm size in France is well above the EC average (table 4),
but suprisingly small for a country with a well-developed and important agricultural
sector.  France accounts for nearly one-quarter of the agricultural area of the
Community (table1).  Some 38% of agricultural land is owner-occupied with 2%
farmed under sharecropping arrangements and the remainder tenanted (table 5).  The
small size of farms is due in part to the historical fragmentation of holdings under the
Code Civil rule of equality in inheritance, whereby all surviving offspring were entitled
to a physical share in the deceased’s property.  This trend has been reversed by a
redistribution process called ‘remembrement’ (compulsory land consolidation and
infrastructure improvement) and by ‘preferential allotment’, whereby one successor
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takes the all land and makes a cash settlement to the other heirs.  Land ownership and
acquisition are closely controlled through regulations dating back to the Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1946.  Leases must be for a minimum of 9 years and are automatically
renewable.  Landlords can repossess if they wish to farm themselves, and tenants are
given the pre-emptive right to purchase.  Thus owner-occupation is encouraged.
Twenty-seven rural settlement corporations (‘SAFER’- Societes pour l’amenagement
foncier et l’etablissement rural) were established under the Agricultural Guidance Act
1960.  These are now very active and, in effect, control the land market, with powers
to buy, sell, and lease agricultural land, generally favouring new entrants and
established families.
Contrary to the popular opinion that the French have sought to maintain a peasant
economy, farm restructuring has been actively promoted, with France operating its
own structural policy through three mechanisms:
1. Consolidation of holdings - achieved through extremely beaurocratic and
complicated processes, involving local government committee and public inquiry
stages.  In excess of 13 million hectares have been redistributed in this way;
2.  Structural administrative control - operating through a complicated ‘minimum
settlement acreage (‘SMI’), whereby a special administrative committee oversees all
enlargements, break-ups and farm settlements.  The committee also controls the use of
land by the ‘buyer’, requiring authorisation to farm if they have no training, or if they
are expanding from another farm.  This is defined under the Agricultural Guidance Act
1960 as ‘family farm holding with personal liability’.  The system was modified in 1990
in response to claims that it was inflexible, but nevertheless, control of enlargement is
not likely to disappear for many years;
3.  Freedom over land use - given to farm tenants under the French Landlord and
Tenant Act.
17
Successions are dominated by family members, with only 10% of new farmers coming
from outside the industry.  It has been estimated (CEC, 1991) that outsiders require to
invest three times as much to acquire the same productive capacity.  Three main types
of transition have been identified:
- a period of employment as farm worker on the family farm;
- an “autonomous transition”, where the son becomes an associate or runs one of
the farm enterprises- characterised by an arrangement known as the ‘family
company’ or GAEC (Groupement Agricole d’Exploitation en Commun); and,
- the absence of any co-operation, commonly found on smaller, peasant-type
holdings.
Most land transfers appear to occur through a process of family leasing arrangements.
In this way, the successor’s requirements for capital are much reduced.  Even so,
capital take-over is a major problem and many young farmers have high levels of
indebtedness.  In an attempt to address this problem, France has adopted a policy of
financial aid via reduced interest rate loans and improvement grants, particularly
targeted towards young farmers.
Italy
Italian agriculture exhibits a great number of small holdings, high employment, much
part-time farming, as well as strong regional differences in structures and social
attitudes to the land.  Accounting for only one-eighth of the EC agricultural area, yet
contributing one-third of its holdings (table 1) farm size is consequently small,
averaging only 5.6 hectare (table 4).
There exists no single complete code of agrarian law, rather a set of fragmented,
purpose-specific rules which make generalisms about the sector difficult if not
meaningless.  In addition, the background to land ownership is somewhat more
complex than elsewhere in Europe, with not only private and a significant state
ownership of land, but also a third intermediate category of Uso civico, land over
which there exists communal rights, accounting for one-sixth of the agricultural area.
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Article 44 of the Italian Constitution is the most important statutory instrument.  This
seeks to secure efficient use of agricultural land, through (inter alia) state controls over
private ownership, the redistribution of land, and the protection of small and medium-
sized units.
Two policies of land reclamation and agricultural land reform operated from 1950 until
the 1980s, but were largely confined to specific regions, and were unsuccessful:
promoting small, inefficient holdings as much as efficient restructuring.  At the same
time regional measures specific to the south (implemented through the Cassa per il
Mezzogiorno), the mountain communities, and the green plains (piani verdi) were
established, and were aimed at promoting economic development in those regions,
although they too have been largely ineffective.  A national plan for agriculture was
formulated in the 1970s in an attempt to increase productivity and to stem rural
emigration and loss of agricultural land to urban development.  This was based on two
proposals, the quadrifoglio which was supposed to target public intervention, and a
new law to attract young farmers back to the land.  Both failed to meet their objectives
while the second has been called an ‘absolute failure’ (Pooru, 1992). The subsequent
adoption of EC directions in the 1980s aimed at overcoming surpluses has further
localised successful agriculture and marginalised the more remote hill, mountain and
southern regions.
There is a long established principle of indivisibility of land, which limits subdivision of
holdings.  However, this is of limited practical application as there is no specified
minimum size.  More effective in stemming subdivisions is the right of pre-emptive
purchase given to family members working in the farm business.  Loans and tax reliefs
are given to assist small and medium sized holdings (under article 44) and are
administered by the Cassa per la formazione della proprieta contadina. and the Enti
di sviluppo.  Such arrangements are usually reserved for working farmers and are
limited to single farm holdings. The creation of peasant landownership is still an
objective behind many Italian laws governing land sales.
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Measures to promote land amalgamations under single ownership exist but are rarely
used.  The right of a neighbour to purchase pre-emptively on the same terms as a third
party, is however commonly exercised, as are the rights of tenant-farmers and
sharecroppers (mezzadria and colonia parziaria) to buy from landowners intending to
sell.  Such rights have assisted in the restructuring, or at least the maintenance, of the
existing size structures.
Tenancy and sharecropping have been the most common forms of occupation,
although the tenancies actually have little in common with leasing arrangements in
most other European countries, exhibiting principles of produce-sharing and
management responsibility more akin to sharefarming arrangements.  The laws of
custom which regulate these agreements historically have favoured the landowner, and
the consequent feudal connotations attached to them led to reforms in 1964 which
strengthened the occupiers rights and gave statutory protection to new contracts.
Further legislation in 1982 outlawed any new agreements which were not tenancies
thus bringing new Italian tenancies in line with the more european concept of
leasehold, establishing principles for security of tenure with rent controls and minimum
term lengths of 15 years.
For farm structures therefore, the lack of a coherent principle of indivisibility combined
with strong family sentiments governs successions.  Traditionally a long period of co-
operation occurs before the handover of land, which is often not until the parents
death. Unless the farming successor has managed to build up enough capital with
which to buy out the other siblings, the maintenance of the farm structure is usually
achieved by  renting or sharefarming from the other co-heirs.  Even on the more
commercial farms, where tak overs by a single family member can be achieved, access
to land for expansion is so limited that modernisation of working capital is often the
only way of increasing efficiency.  In practise this is difficult as Italian banks do not
generally regard agriculture as a sound investment.  The combination of these factors
has led to the continued importance of part-time farming in the maintenance of young-
farmer incomes and also the use of contractors effectively farming several fragmented
holdings on behalf of farmers often living off farm and near to their urban employment
site.
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The Italians do not appear to view the encouragement of young farmers, whether from
within or outside agriculture, as being of any relevance to structural reform.  Indeed, as
a policy objective, the improvement of farm structures has attracted little consideration
and EC measures to help young entrants have had only a minimal impact.  The strong
divisions in Italian society (Furlong, 1994), between rich and poor, North and south,
and between the large estates (latifundia) and smallholdings (minifundia) look set to
continue (Mucci, 1992).
Ireland
Irish farm business structures are similar to those found in southern European states; a
high proportion of ‘family farms’ (table 3) and a high percentage of farmers aged over
55, reflecting the widespread and historical influence of peasantism.  Despite the inertia
exhibited by farm structures, and the apparent lack of modernisation, the sector plays a
significant role in the economy, employing 15% of the workforce and contributing
8.5% of Gross Domestoc Product and 28% of Irish exports.  Owner-occupation is the
dominant tenure, involving 88% of all farmland.  Family ownership passes between
generations free of charge indicating the extremely important role of the family.  This
maintenance of the status quo is supported both by government, and by rural society as
a whole.  Renting occurs on a small scale only, as it is generally regarded as socially
inferior and unacceptable to young farmers.  Indeed, the lack of a rented sector,
combined with a very small market in freehold farms, makes it almost impossible for
outsiders to get into farming.  It is also responsible for the continuation of weak
structures, characterised by small, livestock farms incapable of supporting long periods
of transitionary co-operation between retir r and successor, and often necessitating the
involvement of the farmer in off-farm employment.
Whilst the state indirectly favours family successions, it does little to positively assist
young farmers, who, whilst taking over the holdings relatively free of debt, have little
capital available to invest or modernise their farms.
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Greece
In ways similar to Italy, Greek agriculture faces structural problems epitomised by
family dominance, inefficient successions, and generally poor attitudes towards
modernisation.
Equality in kind, at least among male heirs, is widely practised, as is the increased
reliance on part-time farming, perpetuating the preponderance of fragmented and small
peasant holdings.  Although the rented sector has increased recently, this is largely as a
result of family arrangements, and has not affected the dominant social characteristic-
that most landowners regard themselves as farmers.  Greek farming also exhibits a
‘top-heavy’ age structure, with less than 6% being under 35 (representing only 5,000
full time farmers out of 950,000 registered holdings).  On accession to the EU in 1981,
the government secured extra funds for structural assistance.  Despite this, and despite
having implemented Community aid programmes to assist farmer training, the young
farmers that do come into the business are usually untrained and inexperienced, and
therefore do not generally contribute to the innovation or modernisation of the
business.  Farming is held in low regard amongst the young, and where only one
successor takes over, he will usually be the son with the weakest academic
achievements and the lowest aspirations.  The social regard for farming therefore
results in the continuation of largely peasant activities and a general lack of investment.
While investment by Greek young farmers is the lowest in the EC the level of
indebtedness is also low, partly explained by high interest rates.  Farm incomes remain
low, such that capital accumulation is limited and opportunities for modernisation
further restricted.  The implementation of Regulation 797/85 has largely been aimed at
on-farm improvements rather than at structural reforms consisting of, for instance,
amalgamations.  One key reason for this is that a high proportion of holdings would
fall below the minimum acreage specified for land allocation schemes.
22
Spain
In common with the other Mediterranean countries, Spain is characterised by small
farms, a high proportion of part-time farmers (53% spend less than a quarter of their
time working their farms) and an ageing farming population (23% over 65).  Owner-
occupancy is the dominant tenure (76%), but although there is a relatively open land
market, prices are high, and restructuring is hampered by the reluctance among farmers
to borrow funds.
General macro-economic factors impact greatly on farm structures.  Unemployment is
generally high in Spain, and fifteen years of economic crisis has hindered
modernisation.  Agriculture has remained a significant employer throughout and has
seen an increase in the number of young workers, generally employed as family labour.
They often take menial roles on the farm rather than face unemployment in the city
(80% of family labour has no management responsibility).  The role of the father in the
farm business has generally strengthened, with the result that the patriarch retains
control late into life, often until death.  This has two consequences for farm take-overs:
firstly there is a long period of transition, often characterised by a high degree of
subordination; secondly, and despite the underlying principle of equal shares between
heirs, the son who has been ‘groomed’ to take over the farm normally gets a big family
advantage.
Uniquely in the Community, Spanish agriculture exhibits a significant inflow of ‘new
entrants’ (‘incorporacion’) from other backgrounds, not only as workers but also as
proprietors in their own right.  This is explained in part by a large horticultural sector,
which requires lower capital investment and is viewed as a growth sector of the rural
economy.  Most young farmer proprietors are to be found in this sector.  In this way,
movement of labour, even over a relatively small time period, has had an impact on the
pattern of property ownership in Spain.
Farm replication patterns seems to follow the type of production being practised. For
permanent crops and mixed farming, the dominance of family take-overs is declining.
For annual cropping and livestock systems family replication is dominant.
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For the State, farm restructuring is seen as part of the policy to fight unemployment
rather than for the protection of rural economies or for environmental reasons.  Indeed
the success of most of the aid programmes are expressed in terms of number of jobs
created.  Specific agricultural schemes were introduced in 1983, and were updated in
1991.  These consist largely of improvement grants, covering up to 50% of the cost of
the investments.  The schemes have seen a high level of uptake by young farmers,
although the scale of individual projects has generally been small, and the impact on
structural reform has, as yet, been minimal.
Portugal
Like its neighbour Spain, Portuguese agriculture is characterised by small family farms
with an elderly farming population (58% over 55) and plays an important role in
national employment (25%).  However, unlike Spain, Portugal is experiencing an
outmigration of young people from farming, with the number of farmers aged under 35
declining by 46% from 1980 and 1987.
Land prices are generally high, and although the State has regulated farm take-overs
and entrances since 1986, almost all land transactions are ‘unofficial’. Farmers and
landowners generally hold onto their land not only because it is a production tool but
also because Portuguese society places a high value on land ownership.  Most farmers
today have inherited their land from their fathers.  The family plays an important role,
providing not only most of the labour, but also being an important source of finance.
Finance from official sources such as banks is a relatively recent phenomenon and is
still little used.  Restructuring is encouraged, or at least the status quo is maintained, by
generally inequitable division of the family inheritance in favour of a single heir.  The
lack of provision for co-heirs implies the accumulation of off-farm capital, through
non-agricultural employment, practised seemingly as much by the eventual successor
as by his siblings.
24
Renting is relatively insignificant, and whilst it has declined in overall importance, it is
of increasing relevance to farm entrance.  Full-time farming is also increasingly a
feature of young farmers, suggesting that in order to obtain economic efficiency they
are increasingly turning to renting land.
Adoption of EC structural support has been highly selective, and inflexible. The State
has chosen to favour investment schemes rather than specific structural polices.
United Kingdom
Access to agricultural land and family successions has not been a major issue in the
UK: agriculture is a small player in the employment market (2%), while tax and
property laws combine with established inheritance practises which enable take-overs
to occur at minimal capital cost to the successor.  At 64 hectares average farm size is
the highest in Europe, incomes are generally good, and usually a period of co-operative
transition between farmer and son can be accommodated to ensure a smooth transition
of the business between generations.  As a consequence, the labour market is stable,
and there are no fears (in most regions) of a collapse of the farming economy and
wholesale out-migration.
The freehold land market is completely open and unregulated.  Thus whilst farm
structures are dominated by family owner-occupiers and family tenant farmers, there
has developed a considerable ‘commercial’ sector dominated by agribusinesses and
contractor-farmers operating either as owner-occupiers or shar farmers.  This
phenomenon is unique in European agriculture, and it does allow for a significant
inflow of new blood into the industry.
The tenanted sector has been in decline since the turn of the century, from over 90% of
farms to the current figure of around 37%.  Tenants enjoy a large measure of
protection under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, giving them security of tenure
for three generations, a measure of rent regulation loosely tied to the farm profitability,
and freedom of cropping.  The rights of landlords to regain possession are very limited,
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and unlike most other countries do not include the landlord’s intention to farm himself.
Conversely tenants do not have  pre-emptive rights of purchase, although in practise
they will usually be better placed than third parties, whose bids will usually reflect
investment value only (roughly half the vacant possession value).  An imbalance in
protection in favour of the tenant has for long been regarded as having been the main
contributor to the downfall in the tenanted sector and the two-tiered land market.  In
an attempt to revitalise the let sector a new category of tenancy (the ’Farm Business
Tenancy’), where the parties can agree terms virtually unfettered by statutory
interference, was introduced in 1995.  Although only in its infancy, the first indications
are that rather than provide whole farms to let or starter farms for new entrants, this
measure will provide opportunities for existing farmers to expand, and may hasten the
decline of the traditional tenanted sector.
There are no regulations governing maximum or minimum holding size, amalgamations
or fragmentations, and there is a discernible trend towards increasing farm size,
particularly in the more arable South and East.  Successions generally favour one heir,
particularly where a tenanted farm is passed on from farmer to son, with capital being
inherited virtually free of charge (and with minimal taxation).  Provision for co-he rs
rarely causes a significant problem for the business.  There is relatively easy access to
credit, as farming collateral and incomes are generally perceived to be secure.  The
government actually makes little intervention in farm structures, and has chosen not to
implement EC restructuring schemes.  Little provision is made for assisting
modernisation either, except where the investment will reduce environmental impact.
Conclusions
The process of replication of farm businesses, concerned with inheritance of the assets
and succession to the status of farmer (Augustins, 1989) is heavily influenced by social,
economic and legal forces.  Agricultural successions are inextricably interwoven with
the European concept of the family, a feature which distinguishes the sector from other
economic activity.  Barriers are erected, either directly or indirectly, which limit, and in
some instances prohibit, entry by those from non-farming backgrounds.  Although the
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primacy of food production may be in retreat (Marsden et al, 1993), established
farmers and land owning families are likely to continue to control the timing of, and
pattern of access to, agricultural land rights by others.
Three general patterns of succession and inheritance can be identified in Europe:
1.  Total egalitarianism: the equal shares and break up of the farm.  Ostensibly such
systems (Italy) have a negative impact on farm structures.  They are often accompanied
by the divorce between ownership and farming, whereby farmland ownership is
retained as a ‘holding’, but farming is actually carried on by contractors working over
large areas of fragmented farmlands.
2.  No equality of shares, and the retention of the farm as one unit.  This is evidenced
in the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Germany.  The practise relies on goodwill or
tradition within the family unit, and the acceptable selection of one heir as the
successor.  The other heirs would be expected to accumulate their own capital (either
through marriage in the case of females, or through other professional endeavours in
the case of other male heirs).
3.  Equality of  shares, with the maintenance of one unit.  Such systems often rely on
the development of family renting or credit arrangements, or provision being made by
the retiring farmer for the co-heirs.  Often the system is protected by a closed leasing
market, and State regulations over land valuations and acquisitions, which may ease
the financial burden to the successor.  Despite such assistan es, such inheritance
traditions usually result in a higher debt-burden for the incomers, as is evidenced in
France, Belgium and Denmark.
Where Member State governments intervene in the farm replication process this is
almost exclusively to the relative advantage of established farming families.  Laws
governing land ownership and occupation, taxation, and the provision of pensions and
training without exception favour the status quo.  Some Member States have gone
further and have adopted their own specific measures to assist young farmers (France
Denmark and Belgium).  The EC policy with regards to enforcing its own measures
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(the Common Installation Policy for instance) in this respect has been one of laissez-
faire, resulting in a diverse take-up and provision between countries.(see Table 6)
The countries which have no nati nal policy towards farm entrances (Portugal,
Greece, Italy) tend to respect Regulation 797/85.  Several countries had their own
support frameworks prior to accession, and have largely continued with them (France,
Belgium, Denmark).  The UK stands apart, implementing only the investment aid
supplement (MIP).  In southern Europe, the UK and Ireland, young farmers are no
more instrumental in the modernisation of farm structures than other farmers.  In
northern Europe, France has the greatest commitment to EC start-up aid, whilst the
Netherlands and UK have not implemented the aid.
European structural reform, with the objectives of maintaining an efficient and
prosperous (family?) agricultural base is faced with a number of problems, especially if
it persists in dogmatically following pan-Community policies with little regard for
national differences;
1.  In countries where farm structure is seemingly inefficient, agriculture is usually an
important employer.  An unacceptable consequence of restructuring may be higher
rural unemployment.
2.  In most European countries farmland is over-priced; with market price exceeding
the productive capacity.   Open market prices either reflect an additional investment
value, or ownership carries social worth.  This creates high entry costs for the genuine
farmer, and hampers structural reorganisation.
3.  Restrictive government policies, towards ownership and business enlargement
through control of the land market, are outside EC jurisdiction.  Such policies can
actively encourage restructuring (e.g. France) or can severely hamper it (e.g.Denmark).
At the other extreme, leaving such pressures to free-market resolution (e.g. The UK)
does little to assist the maintenance of family presence on the land.
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4.  There is a clear conflict between equality of shares (enshrined in many Member
States’ civil Codes), and the maintenance of a single viable unit.  In the pursuit of
restructuring there is a need to recognise the importance of the relationship between
external capital and the distribution of local property rights.
5.  In the light of the previous problem, there are conflicts between the aims of EC
structural aid either in improving farm structures, or in encouraging modernisation
within existing holding structures.  The two approaches to have been viewed as
alternatives in the pursuit of efficiency, and this ambiguity may have diluted the overall
effectiveness of the policy.
Despite attempts to tackle farm restructuring on a Community-wide scale, the inability
or unwillingness of Member States to pursue uniform policies is apparent.  The
paradox remains that in order to revitalise farming enterprise, succession must be
opened up.
“On the one hand the state must sustain the process of accumulation and the
private appropriation of resources, on the other hand, it must pursue belief in
itself as an impartial arbiter of class interests thereby legitimising its power.”
 (Bornstein et al, 1984)
Yet where a more liberal approach to inheritance has been followed, the principle of
equality has taken precedence and the family influences have remained dominant, to the
financial detriment of the eventual successor.  This has actually hampered efficient
restructuring, perpetuated part-time farming, and caused a stagnation in productivity at
the very time when the input of new and youthful energies should be providing the
impetus for improvements.
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Belgium 93 1.1 1370 1.2
Denmark 87 1.0 2798 2.4
Germany 705 8.2 11843 10.3
Greece 953 11.0 3842 3.3
Spain 1791 20.7 24797 21.5
France 981 11.4 28058 24.3
Ireland 217 2.5 4915 4.3
Italy 2784 32.2 15544 13.5
Luxembourg 4 0.05 127 0.1
Netherlands 132 1.5 2024 1.8
Portugal 635 7.4 3331 2.9
UK 260 3.0 16751 14.5
EC 12 8644 100 115400 100
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Table 2: Employment in Agriculture
Source: Eurostat 1990
                                    Employment in Agriculture as



























Belgium 80.5 25 91
Denmark 69.6 26.8 61.3
France 78.9 27.3 82.5
Germany 67.7 30.8 75
Greece 73 36.4 95.8
Ireland 83.3 32.4 86.5
Italy 79 30.5 60.9
Luxembourg 87.9 21.7 91.9
Netherlands 62 17.4 64
portugal 49.5 37 82.8
Spain 63.3 32.5 69.7





Table 4.  Percentage distribution of holdings by size within each country.
Source *Eurostat 1987, CEC 1994
ave size* 1-10 ha 10-50ha over 50
ha
Belgium 14.8 44.9 48.4 6.7
Denmark 32.2 16.7 63.9 19.4
Germany 16.8 46.2 46.6 7.2
Greece 4.0 89.0 10.5 0.5
Spain 13.8 72.5 21.2 6.3
France 28.6 32.6 48.8 18.6
Ireland 22.7 24.7 63.6 11.6
Italy 5.6 83.8 14.0 2.2
Luxembourg 30.2 28.8 41.0 30.2
Netherlands 15.3 43.9 50.7 4.5
Portugal 5.2 87.9 9.9 2.2
UK 64.4 24.2 41.5 34.3
EC 12 13.3
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Table 5: Percentage of Agricultural land tenanted
1930* 1975 1986 1993
Austria 7
Belgium 59 72.9 68.3 66.3
Denmark 6 14.1 18.3 21.1
Germany 14 29.0 36.4 59.0
Greece 8 22.9 24.0
spain 36 30.2 20.9
France 40 46.7 53.3 60.3
Ireland 2 3.6 4.0 11.9
Itlay 33 17.3 20.0 21.7
Luxembourg 19 41.5 48.3 51.6
Netherlands 51 43.7 35.3 34.0
Portugal 37 33.7 24.5
Finland 2 18.2
Sweden 27
UK 62 43.6 37.4 37.1
Source Eurostat Farm Structure Surveys. *Urwin 1980
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Belgium 840 10045 8.4
Denmark 418 6290 6.6
Germany (FDR) 5515
Greece 233 16600 1.4
Spain 5945 42241 14.1
France 10809 80238 13.5
Irelenad 535 9576 5.6
Italy 1303 42268 3.1
Luxembourg 110 450 24
Netherlands 180 12465 1.5
Portugal 1657 13916 11.2
United Kingdom 137
Source: National and Regional Agriculture departments
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